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Closed-Form Expressions for Relay Selection with
Secrecy Constraints
Xiaojun Sun, Chunming Zhao, Ming Jiang
Abstract—An opportunistic relay selection based on instanta-
neous knowledge of channels is considered to increase security
against eavesdroppers. The closed-form expressions are derived
for the average secrecy rates and the outage probability when the
cooperative networks use Decode-and-Forward (DF) or Amplify-
and-Forward (AF) strategy. These techniques are demonstrated
analytically and with simulation results.
Index Terms—relay selection, Decode-and-Forward, Amplify-
and-Forward, secure communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of transmission medium, wire-
less communications are susceptible to eavesdropping. Tra-
ditional security mechanisms mainly rely on cryptographic
protocols at higher layers. In contrast with this paradigm, the
physical layer security strategies exploit the randomness of
wireless channels, and significantly strengthen the security
of wireless communications [1]-[14]. Potential benefits of
deriving secure information from physical layer have been
reported in [1].
There has been a growing interest in physical layer security.
Wyner introduced wiretap channel model to evaluate secure
transmissions at the physical layer [2]. Csiszar generalized it to
broadcast channels [3]. Leung-Yan-Cheong defined the secrecy
capacity as the difference between the main Gaussian channel
capacity and the wiretap Gaussian channel capacity [4]. Wei
Kang studied secure communications over a two-user semi-
deterministic broadcast channels [5]. Barros generalized the
Gaussian wiretap channel model to wireless quasi-static fading
channel [6]-[7]. The secure MIMO systems were studied in
[8]-[9]. Motivated by emerging wireless application, relay or
cooperative strategies are exploited to increase security against
eavesdroppers [10]-[13]. Lai has shown that secure commu-
nications can take place via untrusty relay nodes jamming
eavesdroppers [10]. Recently, physical layer secure protocols
based on Decode-and-Forward (DF) or Amplify-and-Forward
(AF) strategy have been proposed in [11]-[14] and trusty relay
nodes are employed. To maximize the secrecy capacity, some
power allocation schemes have been presented for DF or AF
strategy in [11] and [12], respectively.
This paper investigates relay selection with secrecy con-
straints in dual-hop cooperative networks, which use DF or
AF strategy. We select the relay node with the maximal
instantaneous secrecy rate to retransmit the received messages.
We assume that the globe channel state information (CSI) is
available [6]-[14] and the number of relays with successfully
decoding is a prior [11][13]. Under this assumption, the
closed-form expressions are derived for the average secrecy
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Fig. 1. Dual-hop relay wiretap channel model. Define S-R-D link as the
main channel and S-R-E link as the wiretap channel. Eve and destination are
located within one cluster while source is at a faraway location outside the
cluster.
rates and the outage probability. A similar work, which also
considered relay selection for secure cooperative communica-
tions, was presented in [14], but it focused on jamming and
outage probability.
II. DUAL-HOP RELAY WIRETAP MODEL
Fig. 1 shows the half-duplex relay system consisting of one
source (S), N relays (R), one destination (D) and one Eve
(E). We assume that the direct links (S → D, S → E) are
not available [11]-[12][14]. Therefore, S transmits confidential
information to D using a trusty R. A third party (Eve) is
capable of eavesdropping on relay’s transmissions. Suppose
that R can access to CSI on wiretap channel and feed back
the CSI to S. This assumption corresponds to the scenario
where Eve is another user interacting with the Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA) network, thus sending signals that
allow R to estimate the CSI [6][7].
The communication occurs in two hops. In the first hop,
S broadcasts the information to relays. During the second
hop, D and Eve observe the output of the main channel and
the wiretap channel from R, respectively. Denoting hSR,n,
hRD,n and hRE,n (n = 1, · · · , N ) as the independent channel
gains for S to nth R link (S → Rn), the nth R to D
link (Rn → D) and to Eve link (Rn → E), respectively.
These channel coefficients are modeled as zero-mean com-
plex Gaussian random variables. Furthermore, additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) is assumed with zero mean and unit
variance. Define the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
for S → Rn, Rn → D and Rn → E as γSR,n = |hSR,n|2,
γRD,n = γn |hRD,n|2 and γRE,n = γn |hRE,n|2, where
γn is the average SNR. Then γSR,n, γRD,n and γRE,n are
exponentially distributed random variables with rate parameter
1, λm,n and λe,n, respectively.
2In the second hops, only the R with the largest instantaneous
secrecy rate is selected, which assists S to deliver messages
to D via a DF or AF strategy. The instantaneous secrecy rate
about nth-relay link is defined as [6]
Rs (Zn) =
{
lnZn, if Zn > 1
0 , if Zn 6 1
(1)
where Zn = (1 + γm,n) / (1 + γe,n) is the equivalent SNR,
γm,n is the SNR of main channels and γe,n denotes the SNR
of wiretap channels.
III. RELAY SELECTION WITH SECRECY CONSTRAINTS
This section characterizes the relay selection with secrecy
limitations in terms of average secrecy rate and outage prob-
ability as follows. The equivalent instantaneous SNR at the
output of the relay selection can be expressed as
Zmax = max {Z1, · · · , ZN} (2)
with cumulative density function (CDF) as
Fmax (z) =
N∏
n=1
Fn (z) (3)
where Fn (z) is the CDF of Zn. Then, the average secrecy
rate can be calculated by using (1) and (3)
Rs =
∫
∞
0
Pr (lnZmax > x)dx =
∫
∞
0
1− Fmax (ex)dx (4)
and the outage probability at a target secrecy rate R can be
written as
Pout (R) = Pr (lnZmax 6 R) = Fmax
(
eR
) (5)
A. Relay Selection Based on DF:S-DF
The exact expressions for average secrecy rate are calculated
in this subsection. When DF strategy is used, the instantaneous
SNR is γm,n = γRD,n and γe,n = γRE,n. The CDF of Zn is
given by
Fn (z) = 1− λe,n exp (−λm,n (z − 1))
λm,n (z − 1) + λm,n + λe,n (6)
Proof: We rewrite Zn as Zn =
(1 + γRD,n) / (1 + γRE,n) = (1 + x) / (1 + y). Since x
and y are independently exponentially distributed random
variables, the CDF of Zn can be derived as
Fn (z) = Pr (Zn 6 z)
=
∫
∞
0
f (y)dy
∫ yz+z−1
0
f (x)dx
= 1− λe,ne−λm,n(z−1)
∫
∞
0
e−y(λm,nz+λe,n)dy
(7)
which yields (6) after some simple manipulations.
Using (3), (6) and after applying some algebraic manipu-
lations, we can express 1 − Fmax (ex) as
∑
i
ςi
exp(−βi(e
x
−1))
ex+αi
when channels are independent but not identically distributed
(INID). The integration in (4) can be rewritten as
Rsdf =
∑
i
ςi
∫
∞
0
exp(−βi (ex − 1))
ex + αi
dx
u=ex−1−−−−−→
=
∑
i
ςi
∫
∞
0
exp(−βiu)
(u+ 1 + αi) (u+ 1)
du
=
∑
i
ςi
αi
[Fe (βi)− Fe (βi + αiβi)]
(8)
where ςi, βi and αi are the coefficients of the identical equa-
tion. Fe (x) = exp (x)E1 (x) and E1 (x) is the exponential-
integral function [15]. A similar result can be obtained when
the channels are independent identically distributed (IID) by
using [15, Eq.(3.353-2)].
B. Relay Selection Based on AF:S-AF
Selection AF with the average power scaling (APS) con-
straint [16] for secure communications is studied in the
following. The analytical result for AF-APS relay is difficult
unless we assume that the SNR of the S → Rn links is larger
than the SNR of the Rn → D/E links [16]. And then, the
instantaneous approximate SNR is γm,n = γSR,nγRD,n and
γe,n = γSR,nγRE,n. Let µ denote γSR,n and use (6) and [15,
Eq.(3.324-1)], we can write the approximate CDF of Zn as
Fn (z) = 1−
2λe,n
√
λm,n (z − 1)
λm,nz + λe,n
K1
(
2
√
λm,n (z − 1)
)
(9)
where K1 (·) is the 1th-order modified Bessel function of the
seconde kind [15].
Applying (6) and these approximate expressions to (4), we
have a closed-form approximation (10) by using (8) and [15,
Eq.(6.565-7)]
Rsaf =
∑
i
ςi
αi
∫
∞
0
[Fe (βi/µ)− Fe (βi (1 + αi) /µ)] e−µdµ
=
∑
i
4ςi
αi
[ξ1,iS−2,1 (ξ1,i)− ξ2,iS−2,1 (ξ2,i)]
(10)
where ξ1,i = 2
√
βi, ξ2,i = 2
√
βi (1 + αi) and Sa,b (·) is
the Lommel functions [15]. Simulation results show that (10)
provides an upper bound for the average secrecy rate.
C. Optimal Power Allocation for DF:OPA-DF
For comparison purpose, we just introduced the power
allocation scheme for DF-based protocol [11]. Let us de-
fine the N × 1 vectors w = [w1, · · · , wN ]H , hm =
[hRD,1, · · · , hRD,N ]H and he = [hRE,1, · · · , hRE,N ]H , the
N × N matrices Rm = hmhHm and Re = hehHe . For a fix
transmit power γ0, the problem of maximizing the secrecy rate
ln
[
(1 +wHRmw)/(1 +w
H
Rew)
]
is formulated as
max (1 +wHRmw)/(1 +w
H
Rew)
s.t. wHw = γ0
(11)
The solution reported in [8][9], is the scaled eigenvector
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the symmetric
matrix (IN + γ0Rm) (IN + γ0Re)−1.
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Fig. 2. The average secrecy rate assuming IID Rayleigh fading. Normaliza-
tion is performed with respect to the capacity of an AWGN channel with the
same SNR of main channel.
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Fig. 3. Outage probability for a target secrecy rate 0.5 assuming IID Rayleigh
fading.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We illustrate the performance of S-DF, S-AF and OPA-DF
in this section. In our test, we assume that all channels are
IID Rayleigh fading and the average wiretap channel SNR
is γe = 10dB. Similar conclusions can also be derived when
channels are INID and γe is other values. We do not plot these
curves due to space limit.
Fig. 2 shows the average secrecy rate of S-DF, S-AF and
OPA-DF. The average secrecy rate of S-DF is larger than that
of S-AF. For comparison purpose, we also plot the curves
of OPA-DF. It can be seen that OPA-DF outperforms S-DF.
Compared to selection model, OPA may have higher imple-
mentation complexity, such as, synchronization of multiple
access. The outage probabilities of S-DF and S-AF for a target
secrecy rate 0.5 are depicted in Fig. 3. As expected, S-DF is
also better than S-AF. Taking into account the same number
of relay nodes, we find that the performance of selection AF-
APS, which has the lowest complexity, is the worst. Fig. 2-3
also show that S-AF may outperform S-DF when the number
of AF relay nodes is larger than that of DF relay nodes.
We can see from Fig. 2-3 that the theoretical results of S-
DF are almost the same as the experimental curves. Simulation
results show that the analytical results of S-AF match exactly
with the simulated curves when the SNR of S → Rn link is
about 16dB higher than that of Rn → D/E links.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the exact mathematical expressions for
the average secrecy rate (ASR) and the outage probability (OP)
of selection DF with secrecy limitations. As a result of com-
puter simulation, the theoretical results are almost the same as
the experimental curves. The closed-form approximations for
the ASR and OP of selection AF have been derived and match
exactly with the simulated curves when the SNR of S → Rn
link is about 16dB higher than that of Rn → D/E links.
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